

## **Public Sector Anti-Corruption Policies: A Thematic Analysis**

**Dr. Ola Abdel Moneim Emara**

**Faculty of Management Sciences, October University for Modern  
Sciences and Arts (MSA)**

### **Abstract:**

A thorough and comprehensive analysis of corruption that occurs inside the purview of the public sector is depicted in this study, paying careful attention to the conceptual underpinnings and theoretical foundations of this phenomenon and putting an emphasis on its possible ramifications on the performance of the public administration, on the formulation of policies, and on society at large. The paper explores the various manifestations of corruption within the public sector, the complexities associated with measuring corruption, and scrutinizes the governmental policies, strategies, and arrangements that aim at combating and preventing corruption in the public sector while also assessing their conformity with relevant global initiatives.

The debate on the common international measures, especially the ones that focus on corruption in the public sector, their presumed assumptions, and why they may not reflect the countries' performance, is raised. Hence, the paper adopts a thematic analysis methodology to put a hand on the dilemmatic perspective of the common measures of public sector corrupt behaviors and provides a diagrammed manifestation that supports the understanding of the complexity of the correspondence between the efforts exerted for combating corruption as a global movement and the slight mirroring of such efforts in terms of improvements on the global measurement spectrums.

The paper proposes a clustered path to handling administrative corruption, taking the prospects of government policy intervention into proposed dialogues and remedy scenarios while following the global trend of not only combating but also preventing corruption.

**Keywords:** Public sector corruption; corruption theories; public sector corruption materializations; corruption measurement; public sector anti-corruption policies.

## رؤية تحليلية لسياسات مكافحة الفساد في القطاع العام

د. علا عبد المنعم عمارة

مدرس الإدارة العامة بكلية علوم الإدارة، جامعة أكتوبر للعلوم الحديثة والآداب

### مستخلص:

تقدم هذه الورقة البحثية تحليلاً شاملاً للفساد داخل القطاع العام، مع التركيز على الأسس النظرية لهذه الظاهرة، وعلى تداعياتها المحتملة على أداء العاملين بالأجهزة الإدارية، وعلى صياغة السياسات العامة والاستراتيجيات ذات الصلة. وتكشف الدراسة مختلف مظاهر الفساد داخل القطاع العام، والتعقيدات المرتبطة بتتبع روافده. وتستعرض الدراسة التدابير الدولية الهادفة لمنع ومكافحة الفساد، وتوفق في السياسات العامة والاستراتيجيات والترتيبات الحكومية التي تؤسس لمنع ومكافحة الفساد في القطاع العام وتعمل على الربط بين تلك التدابير الإدارية وبين المبادرات العالمية. وتتبنى الدراسة منهج التحليل الموضوعي لتفنيذ مشكلات القياس المرتبطة بالمقاييس المتعارف عليها دولياً لقياس سلوكيات الفساد في القطاع العام. كذلك تعرض الورقة للجدل القائم حول قياسات الفساد الإداري، وافتراضاته الرئيسية، وترصد وتحلل احتمالية ألا تعكس تلك القياسات أداء البلدان في متواليات زمنية تواكب مسارات التحرك العالمي لمنع ومكافحة الفساد. ومن ثم تدعم الدراسة جهود البحث العلمي في مجال الإدارة العامة في فهم تعقيد التطابق بين الجهود المبذولة لمكافحة الفساد كتوجه عالمي والانعكاس الطفيف لهذه الجهود على القياسات العالمية للفساد الإداري. وتقدم الورقة البحثية لمسارات متوافقة لمعالجة الفساد الإداري من منظور السياسات العامة تربط بين السياسات الحكومية الموجهة لمنع ومكافحة الفساد الإداري، وبين الاستراتيجيات والتدابير وأدوات السياسات التي تنتهجها الدول لمكافحة الفساد، بما يَدْعَم تفعيل التدابير الوقائية لتجفيف تلك الظاهرة.

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** الفساد في القطاع العام؛ نظريات تفسير الفساد الإداري؛ أشكال الفساد في القطاع العام؛ قياس الفساد الإداري؛ السياسات العامة لمكافحة الفساد الإداري.

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**1. Introduction**

Corruption in the public sector has far-reaching effects; hence, scholars in the field of public administration have paid close attention to the issue. The existing literature suggests that corruption remains a significant challenge that poses a threat to both domestic and international security.<sup>1</sup>

Corruption costs extend beyond just monetary ones. When bribery drives up prices, ultimately consumers and taxpayers pay the price. For instance, if a contract is issued on the condition that the winning bidder bribes a corrupt official, that money is not really the winning bidder's but the taxpayers. In addition to this, public funding decisions may be distorted when corruption is present. It is possible that less valuable projects that pay bribes will be given the go-ahead rather than ones that do not pay bribes as a result of the corruption that exists. Besides, when there is widespread corruption, the legitimacy of the government may come into question. When people have the perception that public employees are corrupt, law-abiding individuals become suspicious, and other people may be lured to defy the law when it is inconvenient for them to do so. When governments ask the public to contribute to the public good, whether through taxation, conformity with rules, or other personal sacrifices, a government whose public servants lack virtue is less likely to elicit virtuous behaviour from its citizens.<sup>2</sup>

Under the condition that public sector corruption exists, many sorts of administrative malpractices and distortions may dominate. This includes: (I) "*economic rent*" that takes place when one party

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<sup>1</sup> Armev, L., and F. Melese. "Minimizing public sector corruption: The economics of crime, identity economics, and money laundering." *Defence and Peace Economics* 29, no. 7 (2018): 840-852.

<sup>2</sup> Grabosky, Peter Nils, and Peter Larmour. *Public sector corruption and its control*. Woden, Australia: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2000.

controls access to a scarce resource and can charge others for using it. Here, the owner of such a scarce resource may charge a monopolistic premium for its use in order to extract economic rent or monopoly profit. Public servants in favored positions may engage in "rent-seeking activities," including but not limited to deception, exploitation, bribery, and other corrupt practices. (II) "*Rule- and regulation-alteration*": basically and with regard to the principles of governance, the establishment and implementation of rules and regulations and the importance of ensuring their transparency and consistency become essential, which have a detrimental effect on the consistency of the rules and regulations that should ideally remain stable and not be subject to frequent or arbitrary changes, but with the occurrence of corrupt actions, the game may become unviable, and participants may opt to discontinue their involvement, particularly if there is a frequent alteration of regulations. (III) "*Discretionary powers*": It is worth noting that while the provision of discretionary powers is necessary to allow administrators the flexibility required for the interpretation and implementation of rules and that it is imperative to allow officials who are responsible for administering and implementing the rules to exercise a certain degree of discretion and personal judgement, this can set the stage for bureaucratic corruption. (IV) "*Accountability*": accountability holds significant importance in the discourse surrounding corruption, as accountability pertains to the adherence to established rules and regulations, but corrupt actions by bureaucrats commonly destroy the potential effectiveness of an accountable administration.<sup>3</sup>

In light of these shortcomings, this paper focuses on the phenomenon of "*public-sector corruption*." The paper discusses various theories that explicate corrupt behaviour, different forms of corruption, techniques to quantify corruption, and efforts and policies aimed at struggling against corrupt acts in the public sector.

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<sup>3</sup> Myint, U. "Corruption: Causes, consequences and cures." *Asia pacific development journal* 7, no. 2 (2000): 33-58.

The paper seeks to accomplish a thematic diagnosis of anti-corruption strategies and practices in the public administration context. It achieves this by examining and synthesizing several academic publications that have expanded the knowledge of corruption in the public sector. Particular focus is given to defining corruption in its many forms, examining the theoretical bases that have been constructed to explain its origins and effects, and identifying the indicative symptoms of administrative corruption. This research delves into the complicated issue of quantifying the phenomenon of administrative corruption, bringing to light many challenges and questions that arise from this undertaking.

Through this thematic analysis, the paper aims to provide a deeper insight into the complex nature of public sector corruption for the purpose of drawing implications for governance, policy-making, strategy, and tool determination to prevent it.

***This study is laid out as follows:*** A methodology part comes after the introduction and is followed by mapping the "*scholarly-reviews*" concerning the definition and the underlining theories of the phenomenon of public sector corruption; a section on the materialization of corruption in the public sector; a particular section that covers measuring public sector corruption; and, a section on the public policy paths for addressing administrative corruption.

## 2. Methodology

The study uses a qualitative descriptive methodology to give a thorough description of corruption in the public sector, a phenomenon that affects both individuals and entire societal groups and has a common universal manifestation. The study employs a qualitative descriptive thematic analysis to identify public sector corruption patterns and present them as overarching themes. The target is to provide comprehensive understanding; connotations; and associations relevant to public sector corruption. In this regard, the study conducts a systematic review of literature that enhances

comprehension of public sector corruption definitions; manifestations; measurement; and controlling public policies. The thematic analysis approach is employed as well to discern the elements that are deemed meaningful in connection with combating corruption. The process of analysis yields a response to the research inquiry, where the answers to the precise research questions are addressed during the course of qualitative research analysis.<sup>4</sup>

The paper attempts to answer the following investigative questions:

1. How may public sector corruption be framed in terms of meaning; in accordance with relevant explanatory theorization; and in terms of magnitudes of appearances?
2. Why is measuring corruption, especially the most commonly used globally relevant indicators, deemed challenging?
3. How may administrative corruption be addressed in terms of policies, strategies, and technical tools?

### **3. Scholarly Readings on the Definition and Underlining**

#### **Theories of the Phenomenon of "*Public Sector Corruption*"**

##### *3.1 Understanding What the Term "Public Sector Corruption" Means*

The intricacy of corruption renders its definition a challenging task. Commencing with the most prevalent delineations, corruption, according to the World Bank's September 1997 anti-corruption policy, is "*the use of public office for private gain.*" "*Public sector corruption,*" or corruption committed by civil servants or politicians, is highlighted in this description.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See:

- Braun, Virginia, and Victoria Clarke. *Thematic analysis*. American Psychological Association, 2012.

- Lochmiller, Chad R. "Conducting Thematic Analysis with Qualitative Data." *Qualitative Report* 26, no. 6 (2021).

<sup>5</sup> Mugellini, Giulia, Sara Della Bella, Marco Colagrossi, Giang Ly Isenring, and Martin Killias. "Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of

This has not, however, been regarded as a definitive scheme. For instance, there has also been the characterization of "*the abuse of a public or private office for personal gain*"; whilst there exists an evaluative judgement considering the most frequently accepted framing of corruption that has been most extensively embraced as it encompasses a wider scope, "*the abuse of entrusted power for private gain*," as defined by "*Transparency International*" (TI) - 2013.<sup>6</sup> Still, Graycar (2015) advocated that corruption, within the context of the civil service, pertains to the "*unauthorized exploitation of an individual's delegated authority*."<sup>7</sup>

The complexity of the corruption phenomenon led to the emergence of numerous definitions of corruption, some based on public opinion and others on public office or the public interest. Kurer (2005) proclaimed the difficulty inherited in defining corruption according to what the public may assume is a corrupt action, and the problematic nature of public interest violation as a reading for corruption, given that it presupposes a thorough determination of what may be counted as public good, and the difficulty inherited in reading corruption from the perspective of violating public rules, given the likelihood that in some cases the legislative rules may also become corrupt; whilst proposing a definition that describes the diagnostic sphere of corruption as a phenomenon that is centered on any act that violates the non-discrimination rules-as a symbol of impartiality-committed by an official in a public position, hence, presented a view that revolves around public figures who commit acts of discrimination while holding public office, that is to say a reading of corruption as a phenomenon centered on any conduct committed by a public authority that violates the non-discrimination rules.<sup>8</sup>

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corruption: A systematic review." *Campbell Systematic Reviews* 17, no. 2 (2021): e1173.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Graycar, Adam. "Corruption: Classification and analysis." *Policy and Society* 34, no. 2 (2015): 87-96.

<sup>8</sup> Kurer, Oskar. "Corruption: An alternative approach to its definition and measurement." *Political Studies* 53, no. 1 (2005): 222-239.

Nevertheless, a propensity to criminalize corrupt behaviour has established its supremacy. Corruption has been broken down into two broad classes: those committed by government officials (known as "administrative" corruption) and those committed by members of parliament (known as "legislative" corruption). Within the latter, corruption affecting the policymaking process itself (known as "input" corruption) and that affecting the outcome (known as "output" corruption) have been further subdivided.<sup>9</sup>

Instances of corruption within the public administration and legislation are characterized by behaviors such as abuse of power, bias, and misuse of public finances. Legislation can also be influenced by corruption by paying politicians and bureaucrats to change rules for select parties, finance political parties, and sell lawmaking and verdicts. The absence of effective legislative measures and programmes to combat corruption, including judicial independence, as well as preferential taxation and governmental allocation of resources to specific groups, can be considered corrupt rules and regulations.<sup>10</sup>

In accordance with the tendency to criminalize corrupt behaviour, the "*United Nations Convention against Corruption*" "UNCAC" employs certain multifaceted approach to defining corruption as opposed to a singular, comprehensive definition. The convention outlines various forms of corrupt behaviour, categorizing them as criminal acts. Additionally, the "UNCAC" defines a public official as an individual who holds a position in any branch of government, whether employed or designated, regardless of the permanence or remuneration of the position, and irrespective of supremacy. This definition encompasses individuals who perform public duties; those individuals may be employed by public agencies or enterprises, or alternatively, they may engage in the provision of services provided by the government.<sup>11</sup> Following the line, Graycar

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<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. UNODC. United Nations Convention Against Corruption. United Nations. 2004.

(2015) claimed that there are many activities that could lead to corrupt actions, and that the concept of corruption involves a wide variety of behaviors, among them are the inappropriate use of information, and the abuse of discretion, where various activities give rise in certain behaviors including the appointment of personnel, procurement of services, regulation and control of activities like the issuance of permits and licences, and construction projects, among others.<sup>12</sup>

### 3.2 Theories that Explain Public Sector Corruption

De Graaf (2207) articulated the dialectical nature of understanding corrupt behaviour as the deviation from proper conduct by administrators for the benefit of personal gain, proclaiming its cultural reflections and implications, and that this follows a "*Social Constructivism*" perspective that may lead to an extraction that what is corrupt is whatever is deemed corrupt at a given moment and setting.<sup>13</sup> As a result of such contemplations, various hypotheses concerning public-sector corruption were developed.

The most dominantly approached view is presented in the "*Principle Agent Theory*". Corruption is known to take place in the following situations: An agent, who may be a civil servant, representative, director, or member of staff, is responsible for executing a public or private appointment or obligation representing a certain government entity; subsequently, the agent is given sole discretion over a range of matters; the agent has multiple duties as a result of the office, corporation, or institution they represent; the agent uses or tries to use this power or influence in an unsuitable way; a corrupt official or another individual, business, or political group receives personal gain. Corruption

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[https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN\\_Convention\\_Against\\_Corruption.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> Graycar, Adam. "Corruption: Classification and analysis." Op. Cit.

<sup>13</sup> De Graaf, Gjal. "Causes of corruption: Towards a contextual theory of corruption." *Public Administration Quarterly* (2007): 39-86.

often occurs in an obscure (in the norms, etc.) or disguised information context, and it may entail the misappropriation or misconduct involving the misappropriation or destruction of institution property.<sup>14</sup>

Jeff and Shah (2000) discussed two interpretations of the "Principle Agent Theory". *Firstly*, the underlying theory holds that a caring leader (the principal) will urge government workers (the agents) to be honest stewards of public funds, while corrupt public officials will seek or accept bribes so long as the potential benefits outweigh the potential drawbacks, that is to say, being subject to penalty. It is not a ubiquitous phenomenon that private sector interests and entities are prioritized over public sector ones. This phenomenon is particularly evident when bureaucratic entities within the public sector engage in competition for increased budgets in return for favors, or when influential government officials, as represented by lawmakers or elected public servants, establish or manipulate existing policies and laws to benefit specific interest groups.<sup>15</sup>

*Secondly*, a "Neo-Institutional Economics" (NIE) view that asserts that corruption occurs when public officials engage in opportunistic behaviour because citizens lack the ability or are discouraged by high transaction costs from holding them accountable for corrupt conduct. According to the NIE, private individuals are "principals" and government employees are "agents". The principals are circumscribed rational, which means they make rational decisions based on the limited information available to them. The high transaction costs of gathering and processing this data are an obstacle that must be overcome if citizens are to have a more well-rounded understanding of government operations. Agents, on the other hand, are better-educated government officers. When asymmetric knowledge

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<sup>14</sup> Argandoña, Antonio. "The United Nations convention against corruption and its impact on international companies." *Journal of Business Ethics* 74 (2007): 481-496.

<sup>15</sup> Huther, Jeff, and Anwar Shah. *Anti-corruption policies and programs: A framework for evaluation*. Vol. 2501. World Bank Publications, 2000.

prevails, opportunistic behaviour by agents goes unchecked since principals have high transaction costs and there are no or not enough countervailing institutions. The enforcement of contracts, justice enactment, and providing protection to public service recipients are all weakened by corruption. This raises the cost of economic transactions, which in turn raises the cost of private capital and public services. Path dependency worsens the situation.<sup>16</sup>

As per De Graaf (2007), an underlining link prevails in many theories that is advocated as being: A "*Public Choice Theory*" perspective where a 'free' official takes a (bounded) rational choice that results in a mostly predetermined result; "*Bad Apple Theory*" where a bad virtue takes the public sector official to adopt corrupt behaviors; an "*Organizational Culture Theory*" where the culture of a specific group is responsible for inducing a mental and psychological state that lead to unethical conduct, hence under specific conditions, the elements that facilitate the corrupt process are considered to enhance an instrumental sequence; taking this to a broader societal moral values, the "*Clashing Moral Values Theory*" creates an impact of a causal pathway that initiates from societal values and norms which exert a direct impact on the values and norms of individuals, here, the impact of values and norms on the conduct of individual officials can result in corrupt practices; and a view of a "*Public Administration*" where the societal and organizational dimensions intersect to affect individuals' values and norms that are directly affected by societal values and norms, this is where the fundamental bind begins, and this is where corruption can occur through the influence of values and norms on the actions of individual authorities, this also where, in this milieu, the situational factors are largely disregarded, thereby failing to provide an explanation for the differential manifestation of corrupt behaviour among public officials.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Huther, Jeff, and Anwar Shah. *Anti-corruption policies and programs: A framework for evaluation*. Op. Cit.

<sup>17</sup> De Graaf, Gjal. "Causes of corruption: Towards a contextual theory of corruption." Op. Cit.

Ascertaining the "*Public Administration*" view, Persson, Rothstein, and Theorell's (2013) framed the themes of a "*Collective Body of Action*" view where systemic corruption is regarded as a collective phenomenon where individuals tend to justify their own actions based on their perceptions of how others would behave in similar circumstances. When corruption is widely accepted within a society, it can become normalized and perceived as the standard means of achieving goals. Individuals possess knowledge of the adverse effects of pervasive corruption, yet they partake in corrupt behaviour due to the belief that being the sole honest individual in a corrupt system is illogical.<sup>18</sup>

Besides, there is the approach towards "*Institutionalism*," or "*Institutional Theory*," that uses a country's legal framework, the benchmarks for anti-corruption, and autonomous anti-corruption associations with the influence to illuminate administrative corruption. This is where institutional theory examines how structures, schemas, rules, and routines shape social behaviour. The persistence of corrupt practices in organisations, institutions, despite the attempts to eliminate them, is enlightened by the propositions of the "*Institutional Theory*". The analysis evaluates society and categorizes corruption with the framing that the intrinsic qualities, organisational factors, and degree of openness of the political system and its related institutions may become a way to explain the corrupt behaviour in the public sector, where the complicated interaction between corruption, institutions, culture, and gender is proclaimed as the main drive for public sector corruption (Scott, 2004; Debski et al., 2018; Luo, 2005; Stensöta, et.al. 2015).<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Persson, Anna, Bo Rothstein, and Jan Teorell. "Why anticorruption reforms fail—systemic corruption as a collective action problem." *Governance* 26, no. 3 (2013): 449-471.

<sup>19</sup> See:

- Scott, W. Richard. *Institutional Theory*. In: Ritzer, George, ed. *Encyclopedia of social theory*. Sage publications, 2004.

- Luo, Yadong. "An organizational perspective of corruption." *Management and Organization Review* 1, no. 1 (2005): 119-154.

Also, in the light of "*Public Administration*" explanations, Jeff and Shah (2000) highlighted a "*New Public Management*" "NPM" reflection, as "NPM" advocates providing government services via private sector contracts. Such a contract could encourage competitive service delivery in a decentralized administration by encouraging outsourcing and revenue sharing between the client and the service provider. The goals of the "NPM" are consistent with those of localization, as increasing individual accountability for outcomes also increases government accountability to the people via voice and exit mechanisms. So, in theory, the NPM should make it more difficult for people to lie. In this case, empowering individuals is the best way to ensure they live up to their responsibilities and minimize the possibility of corruption. Service providers and consumers are kept apart during the bidding process, which could lead to rent-seeking behaviors and corruption. Others worry that there aren't enough checks and balances in place since dispersed agencies are tougher for higher authorities to monitor.<sup>20</sup>

Furthermore, a "*Game Theory*" argument shows how "*public-sector corruption*" may perhaps become a reality. In view of that, the corrupt behavior can be perceived to form rational decision-making process that is deeply rooted and challenging to eliminate. In the present-day context, individuals encounter a situation that exhibits similarities to the classic "prisoner's dilemma" archetype. This is an illustration of a conflict that arises between the rationality of an individual and that of a collective entity. The concerned party has expressed apprehension regarding the potential disadvantages of abstaining from participating in corrupt activities, citing the possibility that others may not exercise similar restraint in analogous circumstances. Consequently, each person is

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- Stensöta, Helena, Lena Wängnerud, and Richard Svensson. "Gender and corruption: The mediating power of institutional logics." *Governance* 28, no. 4 (2015): 475-496.

<sup>20</sup> Huther, Jeff, and Anwar Shah. *Anti-corruption policies and programs: A framework for evaluation*. Op. Cit.

endowed with a certain degree of advantage, albeit inferior to what they could have obtained had they abstained from participating in unethical behaviour. The presence of unethical conduct in the domain of public procurement is evidenced by the involvement of private sector entities that may harbor reservations regarding the ethical conduct of their counterparts. Organisations that are otherwise principled may engage in procurement corruption due to the apprehension of being outperformed by competitors who resort to illicit or unethical practices. It is crucial to acknowledge that various situational and psychological factors can contribute to the emergence of unethical conduct, despite an individual's conscious effort to behave ethically.<sup>21</sup>

#### **4. Materializations of "*Corruption in the Public Sector*"**

##### **4.1 "*Public Sector Corruption*" Forms and Appearances**

The concept of corruption encompasses a variety of complex and interrelated behaviors that exist on a spectrum, ranging from relatively minor occurrences of bribery or preferential treatment (referred to as petty corruption) to more widespread and systemic abuses of power that occur at the upper echelons of government (known as grand corruption), or even instances where corruption has become deeply ingrained within the fabric of society (termed systemic corruption).<sup>22</sup>

Corruption within the public sector manifests itself in various ways. "*Bribery*" is the act of inducing a public servant to alter their behaviour, either through financial incentives or any other incentive; "*extortion*" is a criminal act in which a public official solicits money or other advantages in return for a desired action or inaction; "*embezzlement*" is a criminal act that involves the

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<sup>21</sup> Kuhn, Steven. Prisoner's dilemma. In: Edward N. Zalta, ed. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University, 2019. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/>

<sup>22</sup> Monteduro, Fabio, Alessandro Hinna, and Sonia Moi. "Governance and corruption in the public sector: An extended literature review." *Governance and performance in public and non-profit organizations* (2016).

misappropriation of funds or assets belonging to the public treasury by a bureaucrat or an administrator seeking to achieve self-interest gains; the act of submitting a false claim for payment of taxes or customs duties by a public servant, to which they are not entitled, is considered an instance of "fraud"; a "conflict of interest" surfaces whereas bureaucrats have the potential to benefit indirectly from an official decision-one scenario involves the allocation of a government contract to a company in which the official holds a financial stake, while another pertains to a planning decision that enhances the value of the official's property; the phenomenon of utilizing power for institutional objectives, without reaping any direct financial gains is commonly referred to as "abuse of power". It is possible for employers operating within the public sector to engage in discriminatory practices for reasons that extend beyond financial motives.<sup>23</sup> Besides, the act of "stealing time" by failing to attend work while holding an official responsibility can be thought as a substantial manner of misallocation of public resources.<sup>24</sup>

Myint (2000) categorized public sector corruption according to its effects on government work. In that, bribery can affect who gets "government contracts," under what terms, and even who gets the subcontracts. Bribery can have an impact on "government benefits" in environments with price restrictions and various exchange rates, such as the distribution of subsidies, preferential pricing, and other forms of financial help. It is not uncommon for bribes to be required in order to contribute in implausible financing of economic activities like the importation of needless goods. Bribery is not limited to monetary incentives; incentivized healthcare, housing, and ownership stakes in privatized businesses are all fair game. "Government generated revenue" refers to the money

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<sup>23</sup> Grabosky, Peter Nils, and Peter Larmour. *Public sector corruption and its control*. Op. Cit.

<sup>24</sup> Mugellini, Giulia, Sara Della Bella, Marco Colagrossi, Giang Ly Isenring, and Martin Killias. "Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review." Op. Cit.

collected from businesses and individuals for services such as security, defense, and public safety.<sup>25</sup>

By "*avoiding regulatory impediments*," bribes can speed up the approval, permission, or licensing procedure for legal activity. The term "*grease money*" refers to a form of payment that is used to improve administrative processes and achieve desired results. Because of their complexity and load, rules and regulations can be expensive to comply with. Bribery "*manipulates legal and regulatory processes*" by paying off regulators to look the other way when businesses or individuals breach the law. This occurs with regards to issues like pollution management, preventing health risks, promoting public safety, enforcing construction codes, and regulating transportation systems. Court proceedings and other legal and regulatory processes are susceptible to corruption. Acts of official misconduct, such as fraud and embezzlement, can be perpetrated independently without the involvement of a third party. Conversely, certain forms of corrupt behaviour, such as extortion, bribery, and influence peddling, involve collusion between the provider and receiver of the illicit gain.<sup>26</sup>

#### 4.2 "UNCAC" Criminalized Public Sector Corrupt Actions

The "*United Nations Convention against Corruption*" "UNCAC" "Chapter III" identifies several actions that are pertinent to the public sector. These include "*bribery in the public sector*" as outlined in Article 15, "*embezzlement in the public sector*" as described in "*Article 17*", "*trading in influence*" as stated in "*Article 18*", "*abuse of functions*" as detailed in "*Article 19*", "*illicit enrichment*" as specified in "*Article 20*", and "*concealment and obstruction of justice*" related to these violations as outlined in "*Articles 24*" and 25, respectively-"Articles:"<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Myint, U. "Corruption: Causes, consequences and cures. Op. Cit.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. UNODC. United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Op. Cit.

مجلة وادي النيل للدراسات والبحوث الإنسانية والاجتماعية والتربوية (مجلة علمية محكمة)

- 15- Providing, proposing, or presenting an unjustified benefit to a bureaucrat, in a direct or an indirect way, for the purpose of influencing their actions or inactions while they perform their entitled mandates, and bureaucrats embezzling, misappropriating, or otherwise diverting property.
- 17- Public officials who embezzle, misappropriate, or divert property, public or private finances, securities, or other valuables for personal gain violate their trust and obligation.
- 18- Prohibits giving or providing an improper benefit to a bureaucrat or to a private individual, in order to persuade them to benefit the original instigator or another person. Soliciting or accepting an unwarranted advantage from an administrative or public institution or authority, either in a direct or in an indirect way, is also covered by this article. This includes bureaucrats and other individuals who exploit their position of power to help others.
- 19- Public officials cannot utilize their status for prejudiced gain.
- 20- Defines unlawful enrichment as a significant rise in a public official's assets that cannot be explained by their legitimate income.
- 24- Criminalizes concealing or retaining property following any of the established offences without active participation.
- 25- Defines obstruction of justice as delaying or hindering "UNCAC"-related legal processes. The perpetrator must know the property was obtained through one of those violations.<sup>28</sup>

## 5. Measuring Public Sector Corruption

### 5.1 Approaches for Measuring Corruption

Quantifying corruption poses a significant challenge. The act of corruption is considered a criminal offence, and obtaining precise information regarding it is equally as difficult as procuring

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*

evidence for other forms of criminal activity. Illicit conduct is often concealed, and individuals who have been victimized may not be inclined or capable of notifying law enforcement officials. When compared to victims of other crimes, those of corruption have a lower probability of coming forward with information. This may be attributed to various factors such as apprehension of retaliation, unwillingness to challenge an established norm, or a sense of shared responsibility. The challenge of gathering pertinent evidence during the inception of corruption measurement necessitated the utilization of indirect methodologies. These approaches do not rely on the direct observation of the phenomenon under investigation, but instead employ alternative means of evaluation. The subsequent indirect methodologies employed in evaluating corruption thus far, on both a domestic and global scale, are as follows:<sup>29</sup>

- Expert evaluations involve a panel of specialists examining corruption patterns in a country or set of countries. Expert opinions gather concise data from a small group of knowledgeable individuals in a given topic. Evaluations of "*integrity*," "*governance*," and "*competitiveness*" in relation to corruption have used these approaches.
- Composite indices are a statistical technique that involves amalgamating multiple data points into a singular indicator. This methodology is frequently employed to measure multidimensional constructs in a concise manner or to consolidate data produced by heterogeneous foundations.<sup>30</sup>

Various types of corruption indicators can be distinguished: (I) many fields employ both "indicators based on perception" and "indicators based on experience" as two kinds of metrics used to examine various aspects of the phenomenon in a variety of

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<sup>29</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. UNODC. Manual on Corruption Surveys: Methodological guidelines on the measurement of bribery and other forms of corruption through sample surveys. 2018. [https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/CorruptionManual\\_2018\\_web.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/CorruptionManual_2018_web.pdf)

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

contexts; (II) indicators that rely on a singular data source, or, the construction of composite indicators; (III) proxy indicators that are used in academic research to indirectly measure or infer a particular phenomenon or variable of interest. Perception-based indicators rely on the viewpoints and assessments of corruption within a particular nation by its populace and specialists. Indicators based on experience assess the tangible encounters of citizens or firms with corrupt practices, such as instances where they have been presented with or provided a bribe. One-source indicators are compiled internally without consulting any outside resources, while composite indicators take many measures from various outside sources and combine them into one. To measure corruption; governance; and, accountability, as well as to aggregate numerous perspectives and signs of corruption, proxy indicators are utilized.<sup>31</sup>

The majority of the information included in these indices comes from assessments and opinion polls. Over the course of the last twenty years, a number of indirect evaluations of corruption have been created. The "*Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index*," "*World Bank Governance Indicators Control of Corruption Indicator*," and "*Global Integrity Index*" are examples. The reliability and validity of indirect assessment techniques are severely compromised. Several a priori assumptions, such as the selection of variables or sources and the design of the technique applied to amalgamate heterogeneous data, are necessary for the generation of competent evaluations and amalgamated indicator metrics. Indirect methods also cannot be used to gather the disparate facts and full insights on corruption necessary for the creation of good policies.<sup>32</sup>

The "*Corruption Perceptions Index*" (CPI) is widely used as a benchmark against which the perceived degrees of corruption in different countries can be compared. This statistic tracks how

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<sup>31</sup> Rohwer, Anja. "Measuring corruption: a comparison between the transparency international's corruption perceptions index and the World Bank's worldwide governance indicators." CESifo DICE Report 7, no. 3 (2009): 42-52.

<sup>32</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. UNODC. Manual on Corruption Surveys: Methodological guidelines on the measurement of bribery and other forms of corruption through sample surveys. Op. Cit.

entrepreneurs and professionals throughout the world rate the perceived level of corruption in each country's administrative sector. Experts and corporations from around the world rate the degree of corruption in each country's administrative sector. Information used to compile the CPI includes instances of bribery, misappropriation of public funds, failure to hold officials accountable when they abuse their positions for personal gain, challenges in combating corruption, red tape that can be exploited for corrupt ends, favoritism in civil service appointments, and disclosure requirements for those occupying influential roles.<sup>33</sup>

The World Bank Group's "*Control of Corruption-Worldwide Governance Indicator*" measures the extent to which public power is misused for private gain. This includes both evident and hidden forms of corruption, as well as the capture of public office by special interests. The aforementioned issues encompass corruption amongst government officials, diversion of government funds, irregularities in payment of public utilities and tax collection, as well as in public contracts and judicial decisions. The inquiry pertains to the prevalence of government corruption, including the extent of "*petty*" corruption between the administration and the general populace, corruption between local administrations and enterprises, and corruption between governments and international businesses.<sup>34</sup>

These are the two well-known perception-based measures: the "*Corruption Perception Index*" (CPI) created by Transparency International and the Control of Corruption (CC) included in the Worldwide Governance measures created by the World Bank; however, both indices are characterized by a high level of aggregation and are heavily reliant on secondary sources, particularly the perceptions of experts. The CPI can be considered a composite index as it draws heavily on the expert opinions of multiple institutions that administer their own surveys utilizing diverse metrics. Several sources evaluate a subset of nations, leading to a situation where the constituent elements of the CPI are not uniformly derived from a single source and may exhibit inter-year variations. The CC uses surveys of households and comments

<sup>33</sup> Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).  
<https://www.transparency.org/en/news/how-cpi-scores-are-calculated>

<sup>34</sup> World Bank. Worldwide Governance Indicators.  
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents>

from experts to gauge corruption in both the business and public sectors. Some of these are confidential. Mixing seemingly unrelated concepts like "*divergence of interest*" with the full amounts of "bribes" spent makes it challenging to integrate and determine the mean of various sources.<sup>35</sup>

Comparisons between consecutive years are deemed to lack significant relevance. The alteration of a country's position in a ranking is contingent solely upon the addition or removal of a nation from the index. Conversely, a uniform ranking of countries can be attributed to their collective progress. The scales employed in the CC exhibit a predominance of subjectivity and a lack of consistency, thus rendering them unsuitable for the consistent monitoring of temporal changes. Disparities between nations are deemed significant only if they exhibit non-overlapping confidence intervals; modifications in the weights allocated by the aggregation process and variations in the sources were responsible for around 50% of the fluctuations detected over time in the CC; although these indicators may have utility in providing a general assessment and attracting media attention, they are unsuitable for providing tailored policy guidance to individual nations; the heterogeneous nature of corruption across nations poses a challenge in establishing a causal relationship between corruption indices and specific policy interventions; in addition, it is possible that these indices could unintentionally discourage efforts to enforce anti-corruption measures, this is because increased media attention on instances of corruption that are exposed may create the perception that corruption is more prevalent, leading policymakers to be hesitant to support strict enforcement measures.<sup>36</sup>

Studies have pointed at the challenges associated with utilizing time series data for the limitations that: the standardization process employed to establish uniform metrics across different indicators does not encompass the capacity to discern temporal variations; that comparing rankings and scores from different years is not

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<sup>35</sup> Smidova, Zuzana. "Building the evidence for OECD integrity and anti-corruption agenda: The current situation and avenues for future analysis." (2020).

<sup>36</sup> Smidova, Zuzana. "Building the evidence for OECD integrity and anti-corruption agenda: The current situation and avenues for future analysis." Op. Cit.

feasible due to the lack of comparability; that the alteration in the composition of the specimens is the underlying reason for this phenomenon; that, the inclusion or exclusion of data sources may lead to changes in the CPI or WGI scores of a nation; that a plausible method, if predicated on a communal pool of resources, would be to contrast a singular nation at two distinct temporal junctures; and that in order to ascertain any potential alterations in methodology or definition over the course of time, a thorough examination of the individual data sources would be imperative.<sup>37</sup>

The "World Bank" uses the results of the "*Country Policy and Institutional Assessment*" "*CPIA*" to determine the level of corruption in the public sector. Economic management, structural policies, social inclusion and equity, and "public sector management and institutions" are the four categories into which the "*CPIA*" divides the 16 benchmarks used to determine a country's ranking. The standards strike a balance between progress and fighting poverty. The terms "*Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector*" and "*Quality of Public Administration*" are subsets of "*Public Sector Management and Institutions*," which covers all of government management and the institutions that run it. The effectiveness of a nation is measured by this indicator. As a result, a country's advancement is dependent on whether or not it satisfies those requirements, as opposed to being the result of an accumulation of improvements across a variety of aspects over the course of a number of years.<sup>38</sup>

### 5.2 Implications of Corruption as a Measurement Complexity

The complexity of anti-corruption reform implementation in the public sector makes it difficult to inherit changes. Many more government employees and representatives will need to adopt new practices if the reforms are to be successful.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Rohwer, Anja. "Measuring corruption: a comparison between the transparency international's corruption perceptions index and the World Bank's worldwide governance indicators." Op. Cit.


<sup>38</sup> World Bank. Data Catalog. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0038988/Country-Policy-and-Institutional-Assessment>

<sup>39</sup> Smets, Lodewijk, and Stephen Knack. "World Bank policy lending and the quality of public-sector governance." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 67, no. 1 (2018): 29-54.

مجلة وادي النيل للدراسات والبحوث الإنسانية والاجتماعية والتربوية (مجلة علمية محكمة)

A reflection of this long-drawn-out change pattern can be watched in the reading of the aggregate (world) measures of the two "Public Sector Management and Institutions" CPIA sub-indicators: (I) "Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector"; and, (II) "Quality of Public Administration".

Figure 1- Two Interpretations of Public Sector Corruption CPIA Measures



Source: Author's analysis based on World Bank, CPIA database.<sup>40</sup>

This discourse aims to explicate two distinct interpretations of the CPIA measures concerning public sector corruption. Firstly: the long-drawn-out change as per the time series reading, especially that it corresponds to the period of global international efforts to prevent and combat corruption as per the "UNCAC" starting in 2004. Secondly, the scale ranges between 2.8 and 3 for both phenomena, with years of identical match (2012 through 2014),

<sup>40</sup> See:


- World Bank. Data Catalog. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.TRAN.XQ>

- World Bank. Data Catalog. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.PADM.XQ>

considering that the CPIA assessment employs a measuring spectrum: 1 lowest through 6 highest are the possible values.

Specifically applying this thought to the CPI, which is widely seen as a leading indication of public-sector corruption, we find the following: despite the collective endeavors and numerous accomplishments, the CPI of 2022 reveals that the magnitude of corruption is steady. For eleventh year running, the average score throughout the world has stayed at 43/100, with 68% of countries 68% obtaining a score below 50. Moreover, the scores for the year 2022 indicate a persistent impasse on a global scale with regards to governmental efforts to combat corruption in the public sector.<sup>41</sup> The regional comparison reading also support this interpreted notion.

**Figure 2- A Comparatively Uniform Reading of the CPI Regional Assessment**




**Source: Author's analysis based on Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, various years records.<sup>42</sup>**

<sup>41</sup> Transparency International. Corruption Perception Index. 2022. [https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/Report\\_CPI2022\\_English.pdf](https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/Report_CPI2022_English.pdf)

<sup>42</sup> World Bank. Worldwide Governance Indicators. <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports>

Figure 3- A Five Years CPI Regional Comparison with Percentile Rank Illustrated



Author's analysis based on Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, various years records.<sup>43</sup>

For that, the CPI scores 'analysis for 2022 has important inferences. The nations situated in the Western European and European Union regions, which have achieved high scores, have either remained static for more than ten years or have experienced a gradual decline over the last five years. Governments' effectiveness is being undermined by factors such as excessive pressure on management, inadequate integrity put to practice, and challenges to law enforcement. Conversely, nations that obtain low scores on the index are likewise impeded in their ability to achieve noteworthy advancements. Across various regions including the "Americas, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa", there persist limitations concerning the public-space and fundamental liberties amidst the presence of numerous crises that

<sup>43</sup>World Bank. Worldwide Governance Indicators.  
<https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports>. Op. Cit.

jeopardize security and stability, as well as the principles of democracy and human rights.<sup>44</sup>

Besides, for CPI 2022, in several Asia Pacific nations, the increasing authoritarianism has the effect of diminishing the role of civil. Additionally, numerous leaders are placing greater emphasis on economic recovery as opposed to anti-corruption endeavors. Within the "Middle East and North Africa" region, and where the balance-of-power suffer due to conflicts, corruption is eroding democratic procedures, engendering widespread social turmoil, and exacerbating instances of aggression.<sup>45</sup>

Another puzzling perspective can be observed when the composite measure reflects the countries' rank rather than the global rank differences. As previously mentioned, the WGI is one of many composite governance indicators developed in response to the growing need for governance metrics. The WGIs measure the intensity to which the public-authority is employed to achieve personal benefit, including both grand corruption and petty corruption, in addition to the appropriation of the state by influential individuals and private concerns. The percentile rank (0-100) denotes the relative position of a country in comparison to all other countries globally. A numerical value of 0 represents the lowest possible rank, while a value of 100 represents the highest possible rank.<sup>46</sup> In the case of WGI the aggregate measure of corruption may not be pertinent on a global scale; nevertheless, it can help, to identify the phenomenon at the country level. This is one of the limitations to the WGI assessment interpretation.<sup>47</sup> This observation also materializes when tracking the WGI's "*Control of Corruption*" over a period of a number of consecutive years *at the regional level*.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Transparency International. Corruption Perception Index. 2022. Op. Cit.


<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> Thomas, Melissa A. "What do the worldwide governance indicators measure?" *The European Journal of Development Research* 22 (2010): 31-54.

<sup>47</sup> Rohwer, Anja. "Measuring corruption: a comparison between the transparency international's corruption perceptions index and the World Bank's worldwide governance indicators." Op. Cit.

<sup>48</sup> For the availability of records, the study conducted a regional comparison.

Figure 4- Uniform Behavior of Phenomenon within/ and across Regions over Different Years for WGI "Control of Corruption"



Source: Author's analysis, based on Worldwide Governance Indicators, various years records.<sup>49</sup>

## 6. Paths for Addressing Administrative Corruption

Since corruption's occurrence in the sphere of public administration is multifaceted, handling administrative corruption requires working on different attributes:

<sup>49</sup> World Bank. Worldwide Governance Indicators. <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports>. Op. Cit.

*Patterning the sphere*-Public administration functions broadly incorporate the following main domains: service delivery, managing public finances, procurement of resources and services, human resource management (recruitment and administration), and acts that involve the release of licences, allowances, and authorizations. And hence, it remains significant that the administrative forms of corruption, i.e., the corruption that correlates to the domain of public administration-related functions, need to be mapped if efforts to prevent and combat corruption are approached. In that, "*bribery*" involves trading licences, privileges, or concessions for personal gain; another corruption related act is when a trusted person "*embezzles*" funds or property, that is to say, when an employee hires people without permission, they are embezzling; "*self-dealing*" in justice administration means utilizing power for personal gain rather than impartial and fair justice; "*abuse of discretion*" occurs when a powerful person acts arbitrarily or irrationally, this tendency can occur in court proceedings, administrative activities, and other situations when people must make decisions that affect others, inappropriate discretion violates equality, neutrality, and the right to a fair trial and may have serious consequences for those affected; "*data misuse*" in programme deliver; construction/manufacturing-"conflict of interest"; or what commonly take place as post-disaster reconstruction that may be subject to "*patronage, nepotism, cronyism, and clientelism.*"<sup>50</sup> The aforementioned are frequently associated with instances of administrative corruption, thereby indicating that policy intervention aimed at addressing and mitigating corruption ought to be focused on these spheres.

The identification of various spheres of administrative corruption is deemed crucial, as previously indicated. However, it is also noteworthy to consider the prevailing trends in addressing corruption within the public sector. Main international predispositions can be identified this includes the tendency to

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<sup>50</sup> Graycar, Adam. "Corruption and public administration." In Handbook on corruption, ethics and integrity in public administration, pp. 1-8. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020.

ensure preventive measures, as in the "UNCAC". In that, Article 7 requires government agencies to prioritize effectiveness, openness, and objective criteria like merit, equity, and capability. We must select and train candidates for corruptible public offices and encourage rotation as part of this endeavor. The public sector should support education and training initiatives that equip workers with ethical, legal, and transparent abilities. These efforts should combat corruption. Article 8 promotes integrity, honesty, and accountability in accordance with legal systems and sets standards for proper, honorable, and legitimate public activities. Article 9 covers government spending and procurement. Effective procurement systems that prioritize transparency, fair competition, and unbiased decision-making can increase the likelihood of securing optimal bids, as can identifying suitable thresholds for the disclosure of procurement procedures and contracts. Article 10 underlines the need for increased openness in all aspects of government administration, including structure, operations, and policymaking. To accomplish this, regulations or guidelines can be put into place to protect sensitive data while still allowing the public access to information about their government's organisational structure, daily activities, and decision-making processes.<sup>51</sup>

***Comprising policies and strategy design and implementation-*** Article 5 of the "UNCAC" requires every State party to fulfil certain obligations, such as fostering, employing, and upholding influential and synchronized procedures to contain anti-corruption, establishing and promoting effective practices to prevent corruption, and conducting periodic evaluations of relevant legal instruments and administrative measures to determine their adequacy in preventing and combating corruption, while Article 6 requires all signatory states to adopt additional actions to combat corruption. It is possible that these establishments will also be responsible for overseeing and coordinating policy

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<sup>51</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs, and Crime. UNODC. United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Op. Cit.

implementation. The Convention's emphasis on State party responsibilities, which are reviewed through the Convention's own Mechanism for the Review of Implementation.<sup>52</sup>

In general, in order to effectively develop "anti-corruption strategies" at the national level, it is imperative to integrate key elements of a comprehensive national anti-corruption policy document. The development of the strategy ought to be overseen by an entity possessing adequate autonomy, proficiency, and political support and should entail substantial contributions from crucial stakeholders both within and outside the governmental sphere. The formulation of a national strategy necessitates an initial assessment and evaluation of the foremost corruption issues afflicting the nation, along with the impediments that impede the successful execution of a robust anti-corruption framework. The initial diagnosis must identify any gaps in knowledge or understanding. The anti-corruption policy should be part of the strategy, which should be based on the preliminary assessment and diagnosis. The policy should set realistic but ambitious goals, prioritize short-term and long-term objectives, and establish a suitable sequence for implementing reforms. The strategy should also include an implementation plan that assigns responsibility for overseeing its execution to a coordination unit and ensures that the various agencies involved carry out the strategy. To ensure that the policy plan's components are executed correctly, have the intended effect, and can be updated as necessary, the strategy should include a plan for monitoring and evaluating the plan's implementation and impact.<sup>53</sup>

***Conforming to a broader governance framework***-The implementation of efficient anti-corruption policies necessitates

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<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. UNODC. National Anti-Corruption Strategies: A Practical Guide for Development and Implementation. United Nations, 2015. [https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2015/National\\_Anti-Corruption\\_Strategies\\_-\\_A\\_Practical\\_Guide\\_for\\_Development\\_and\\_Implementation\\_E.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2015/National_Anti-Corruption_Strategies_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Development_and_Implementation_E.pdf)

their integration into more comprehensive and coordinated governance programmes, rather than being implemented in isolation. The task at hand involves the incorporation of a strategic anti-corruption element into all relevant areas of fundamental governance transformations, thereby integrating anti-corruption measures seamlessly into the societal framework. Incorporating anti-corruption and other fundamental aspects of governance reform into the monitoring and evaluation process of ongoing changes has the potential to strengthen the relationship between these two elements in theory.<sup>54</sup>

In practice, monitoring the anti-corruption outcomes resulting from fundamental governance reforms would entail isolating the specific elements of foundational reforms that will have the greatest impact on fostering openness, honesty, and responsibility. The identification of key elements may be facilitated through the examination of pertinent provisions encompassed by the "UNCAC". The criticality of prioritizing elements and sectors for piloting, obtaining agreement from all stakeholders, selecting pertinent indicators to measure advancement in diminishing corruption or intensifying transparency, forming a pertinent checking practice, and then publicizing outcomes while being in favor of transformation cannot be disregarded. The successful execution of this methodology requires unique institutional structures and attempts to improve the competencies of running information alongside the community.<sup>55</sup>

Taking the process to the broader province, technical advice on combating and preventing corruption in the public sector is expected to adopt certain approaches: (I) to utilize diagnostic tools such as "*The Public Sector Governance Reform Cycle*<sup>56</sup>" - where It

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<sup>54</sup> Transparency International. Corruption and public sector reforms monitoring systems. 2008. <https://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-and-public-sector-reform-monitoring-systems>

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> World Bank. The Public Sector Governance Reform Cycle: Available Diagnostic Tools.

is vital to enhance their ability to carry out tasks such as formulating policies, executing policies, regulating, providing services, and managing administrative affairs, and to boost the state's internal accountability between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and externally to other parties, and to work towards the establishment of sound governance, which is necessitates the utilization of governmental power for the betterment of society as a whole, and hence for the purpose of achieving success, it is also significant that this particular approach is founded upon a comprehensive diagnosis of the deficiencies it endeavors to rectify, additionally, it is crucial that there be cognizance and endorsement from the public service recipients (the citizens), policymakers, and the global community; (II) to invigorate the use of governance indicators- the indicators help to measure how far governments can craft and implement effective policies and guarantee that the government holds institutions that regulate economic and social interactions in prominent regard;<sup>57</sup> and (III) building a system for measuring how well the fundamental tasks of government are being carried out (monitoring and evaluation).<sup>58</sup>

## 7. Concluding Notes

The study integrated a range of theories related to corruption, its diverse manifestations, and methodologies for its quantification. Additionally, the study examined the strategies implemented to combat instances of corruption within the public sphere.

On its path to thematically analyzing the phenomenon of corruption in the public sector, the paper tackled the relevance of dishonest actions in the public sector and their multi-dimensional effects and related costs and consequences. The paper articulated

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<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/7d67251a-4f68-597e-8648-226e765b467a>

<sup>57</sup> World Bank. Data Catalog. Worldwide Governance Indicators. <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0038026>

<sup>58</sup> Transparency International. Corruption and public sector reforms monitoring systems. 2008. Op. Cit.

economic rent as a sort of corrupt behaviour malpractice in the public sector and how rent-seeking may materialize in certain corrupt actions.

Theories that explain the corruption in the public sector were demonstrated with a focus on both the behavioral manifestation and explanation of the corrupt behaviour in the public sector and the theorization that corresponds to the public administration's views and trends as well as the readings of the institutionally influential rationalization.

The study gave special attention and consideration to the manifestation of the phenomenon of administrative corruption and the features of its appearances, and merged the stipulated faces of corruption in the public sector as identified in the literature with the criminalized corrupt actions as per the "*United Nations Convention against Corruption*" as the frame that integrates the international efforts towards preventing and combating corruption.

The study then moved to provide a thematic analysis and descriptive representation of the inconsistent reflections of the efforts of combating and preventing corruption and the readings on the measurement scales of public sector corruption, marking the possible driving factors for such discrepancy.

As a result of the insufficiency of causality of adopted efforts and measures, the study rather emphasized directing efforts towards joining the international movement towards clusters of patterning the sphere of public sector corruption, comprising bundles of public policies and strategies for combating and preventing corruption, as well as adopting a broader governance framework that utilized tools and indicators for public sector monitoring and evaluation systems that correlate the efforts of combating corruption to the overall performance of public administration systems.

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